Over the past 25 years, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of subnational administrative units within developing countries. Existing literature argues that presidents create new units to deliver patronage to citizens. But proliferation at lower tiers of the state, that are too administratively distant from the president to credibly serve as patronage, does not follow this logic. We build from the premise that the creation of a new lower-level unit comes with the appointment of a local administrator who develops a neopatrimonial relationship with the legislator whose constituency subsumes their jurisdiction. Presidents leverage this neopatrimonial relationship and create lower-level units for co-partisan legislators to ensure legislative support and prevent party defections. We find evidence supporting this argument using new data from Kenya. These findings illuminate how leaders can use administrative reform to undermine legislative checks against executive power.
Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, many developing countries have rapidly increased the number of their subnational administrative units.
1 This "unit proliferation" involves the creation of new jurisdictions within a state's territory and is part of a broader trend of states engaging in subnational reforms -changes to the structure of the state that reconfigure the balance of power between the center and the periphery. In some cases, subnational state reforms result in localities gaining power through devolution (Montero & Samuels 2004 , O'Neill 2005 , decentralization (Samuels 2004 , Falleti 2010 , or the creation of federal systems (Ziblatt 2006) . However, governments of other countries have used subnational reforms to recentralize authority and reassert control (Wunsch 2001 , Olowu 2003 . The prevalence of subnational reforms has thus fittingly spurred a research agenda on the effects of such reforms (Prud'homme 1995 , Treisman 2006 , as well as, fundamentally, why central governments choose to alter their relationship with the periphery in the first place (Boone 2003 , Eaton 2004 , Landry 2008 , Bohlken 2016 ).
Though unit proliferation has been supported by the international donor community as a way to create more efficient and responsive states, recent research suggests that many countries' waves of unit proliferation are motivated by presidents' self-interested attempts to either maximize their chances of re-election (Kasara 2006 , Hassan 2016 or respond to bottom-up demands (Pierskalla 2016) , often in expectation of other direct political benefits (Malesky 2009 , Grossman & Lewis 2014 ).
One fact largely overlooked by current literature on unit proliferation -and subnational reforms more broadly -is that countries are subdivided into multiple administrative tiers, ranging from larger "higher-level units" such as provinces or districts, to more localized "lower-level units"
1 O'Dwyer (2006) , Kasara (2006) , Malesky (2009) , Green (2010) , Ayee (2012) , Kimura (2013) , level units in their jurisdiction: lower-level unit creation brings some central resources to the area, but perhaps more importantly, leads to the appointment of a new unit administrator. Because the subnational elected official has national-level linkages, she can influence the appointment and promotion decisions of those administrators in her jurisdiction while also monitoring their behavior.
As such, neopatrimonial relationships emerge between the subnational elected elite and local-level administrators who, in return, double as political brokers for the elite. Elites lobby the president for the creation of more lower-level units within their jurisdiction, as unit proliferation is controlled by the executive branch.
When we apply the theory to legislators, our theory leads to two observable implications. First, the executive will create lower-level units for legislators in her party: lower-level unit proliferation helps the legislator whose constituency contains them, and thus (directly) increases the legislator's re-election chances and (indirectly) decreases the probability of the president losing a legislative majority. 4 Second, because lower-level administrative units tie individual legislators to the president, in weak party systems an executive will create these units to preempt defections by those members of her own party who have a sufficient personal following to leave the party and run as an independent or minor party candidate.
We examine the observable implications of this theory in Kenya in the decade following the return to multi-party elections in 1992. Focusing on this period allows us to leverage Kenya's transition away from a one-party regime when the weak ruling party suffered serious defections.
Lower-level administrative "locations" and "sub-locations" -the two lowest levels of Kenya's fivelevel administrative structure -more than doubled during these years. We find that new units were more likely to be created in constituencies of legislators who belonged to the ruling party and who had strong constituency followings. We run a series of robustness tests that indicate that lower-level unit creation did not directly benefit the president. Our results also indicate that this strategy "worked." We show suggestive evidence that the creation of lower-level administrative units is associated with a 25% decrease in defections from the ruling party, a margin that was necessary to sustain its legislative majority during this period.
This paper makes several contributions. Most directly, this paper adds to the literature on unit proliferation. In line with much existing research, we show that the benefits of unit creation to receiving areas make it a tool that presidents can use to deliver patronage. We differ from existing literature, however, in arguing that this patronage works through a different logic at different tiers: the creation of lower-level administrative units directly helps legislators and thus serves to indirectly help the president by ensuring that she faces less legislative constraint. As with much of the literature on subnational reform more broadly, we suggest that those in charge of designing state institutions of administration opt for the structures that are most politically useful within a given institutional and strategic setting, as opposed to what is socially optimal.
Third, we add to new literature on bureaucratic compliance through legislator oversight. Lowerlevel state officers often shirk from their duties in states with weak monitoring. But officers can be co-opted into complying when their is political oversight (Raffler 2016, Gulzar & Pasquale Forthcoming) . Legislators have an incentive to monitor those lower-level officers in their constituency to ensure that their constituents receive the state resources entitled to them. We show this logic in a new context and further add that presidents can leverage this neopatrimonial relationship between legislators and officers to selectively ensure state administration in some subnational areas over others.
Finally, our focus on a regime in transition allows our results to dialogue with research on the durability of authoritarian regimes. This literature has argued that autocrats construct democratic institutions -including legislatures and political parties -to garner legitimacy and co-opt other ruling elites (Gandhi & Przeworski 2007 ). An executive's control over administrative institutions can prove crucial in propping up dominant parties and ensuring that wavering legislators do not defect, not only because executives dole out cabinet positions to keep elite coalitions together (Gandhi 2008 , Arriola 2009 , Francois, Rainer & Trebbi 2014 , Svolik 2012 or directly fund legislative campaigns (Magaloni 2006 , Greene 2009 ), but by allowing them to permanently change a country's administrative structure as a way to undermine legislative independence. Our findings also indicate that the creation of lower-level administrative units can perpetuate subnational authoritarianism (Gibson 2010 , Mickey 2015 by providing local elites with the administrative resources to bolster their local power.
As such, the political implications of subnational state reforms can be even more far-reaching -and insidious to democratization -than has been suggested previously. Aside from perpetuating hybrid regimes by helping autocratic leaders win elections (Kasara 2006) , reducing elite opposition (Malesky 2009 , Green 2010 , or reducing the ability of subnational governments to constrain the center (Grossman & Lewis 2014) , the results of this paper indicate that unit creation increases executive power through the erosion of inter-branch checks and balances, weakening the capacity of the legislature to effectively constrain the executive.
2 Administrative Unit Proliferation in Developing Countries:
Existing Theory and Evidence
Lower-level administrative unit proliferation has been widespread including among almost two dozen countries in sub-Saharan Africa since 1990, as documented in Table 1 . This indicates a need for theory that understands the causes and consequences of these changes.
[ Hence, much literature has argued that presidents pre-empt these patronage benefits, creating new units in the run-up to re-election campaigns (Kasara 2006 , Ayee 2012 , Hassan 2016 . A second branch has argued that local elites demand these new units (Pierskalla 2016 ) and presidents respond because of resulting political benefits (Malesky 2009 , Grossman & Lewis 2014 . Much 5 The principal administrative tier in Vietnam is the highest subnational tier, provinces (Malesky 2009 ); in Ghana, Indonesia, and Kenya, the principal administrative tier is the second-highest subnational tier (of as many as six) (Kasara 2006 , Ayee 2012 , Pierskalla 2016 . 6 This argument is made by much of the literature. See Kasara (2006) , Green (2010) , Ayee (2012) , Kimura (2013) , Grossman & Lewis (2014) , Lewis (2014) and Pierskalla (2016) . of this literature thus predicts that new units are created outside the president's core regions of support (Kasara 2006 , Green 2010 , Hassan 2016 , as well as in marginalized areas (Grossman & Lewis 2014) or ethnically fractionalized areas (Pierskalla 2016 ) that have traditionally been shut out of procuring state resources.
A second stream of research, that may prove more useful in understanding unit proliferation at lower-levels, argues that new units help executives by increasing their monitoring capacity over the population. This literature recognizes the administrative personnel changes that unit creation entails, a change that occurs regardless of the tier being proliferated. Lewis (2014) argues that the mechanical effects of unit creation -smaller administrative units, and a higher density of administrators -means that administrators can better use their authority and security networks to monitor threats against the regime. Boone (2003) suggests that decentralization more broadly can strengthen local state agents and power brokers.
However, it is unclear if the theory developed for higher-level administrative units from existing work can be generalized to lower-level units for three reasons. First, findings about the politics of administrative unit proliferation examine the proliferation of higher-level administrative units that also serve as each country's principal administrative tier. Accordingly, current research has found that unit creation is a mechanism for a president to deliver patronage. Lower-level unit creation, however, often results in few budgetary changes, meaning that monetary patronage is not the major mechanism in play. Second, the administrative distance between lower-level units and the president makes it unclear if area residents attribute this increase in units to the president, but instead to a subnational political elite who is in a better position to demand, interact with, and directly benefit from their proliferation.
Third, and relatedly, it is unclear if lower-level unit proliferation proliferation increases the president's monitoring capacity. While national executives can closely monitor administrators within the small number of a country's higher-level administrative units, the same level of management is impossible for the administrators within the hundreds or thousands of new lower-level administrative units. Administrators within lower-level units, instead, often cultivate brokerage relationships with the local legislator precisely because the legislator is more accessible and relevant in the management of the area (Fiorina & Noll 1978 , Baldwin 2013 or can better monitor (and reward) their behavior (Gulzar & Pasquale Forthcoming, Raffler 2016) . In the next section, we start from these features of lower-level administrative units to develop a theory of why and where executives will create them.
3 Theory: Executive-Legislative Relations and Lower-Level Administrative Unit Proliferation
Our theory builds on existing research that treats unit creation as a patronage good that is controlled by the executive. But it departs from earlier literature that has emphasized the executive's strategic calculations about the direct effects to herself. Instead, our theory focuses on strategic interactions between the president and subnational elected elites. We posit two scope conditions. First, the subnational elites in question are elected from single-member districts. Second, the officials hired to run new lower-level administrative units are centrally appointed, a feature common across subSaharan Africa and other developing countries. 7 7 This second scope condition allows for a theory that connects the career trajectories of locallevel bureaucrats to the executive via the subnational elite. It also highlights how lower-level unit creation is a distinct phenomenon from other kinds of territorial politics, such as decentralization to elected local governments in Latin America (Eaton 2004 , O'Neill 2005 , Falleti 2010 ). Lowerlevel unit proliferation does not necessarily entail any devolution of authority away from the center, as opposed to the administrative decentralization reforms experienced in Latin America (Falleti 2010) , and instead, more closely resembles "deconcentration," what Boone (2003) defines as the spread of the central state into increasingly rural areas.
Our theory is broadly applicable to contexts where subnational elected elites have the capacity to significantly limit executive power. Some examples include an elected governor of a higher-tier unit who can fight the center for more provincial authority, a legislator in the national parliament who can vote to reduce executive power, or a regional party branch leader who can advocate for other candidates to represent her party for the presidency. We theorize lower-level unit proliferation specifically for legislators for two reasons. First, focusing on legislators gives the theory wide applicability: most countries directly elect their national legislatures, but many do not have other subnational elected elites. Second, focusing on legislators allows the theory to speak to the specific impact of executive-legislative relations on presidential behavior.
We argue that the creation of lower-level units actually alters two important relationships -1) between the local legislator and area residents through the local administrator, and 2) between the executive and the local legislator.
Looking first at the relationship between the local legislator and area residents, the creation of lower-level units serves as a patronage gift that helps the legislator get re-elected. Legislators lobby the executive for more lower-level units within their jurisdiction. They do so as this shows area residents that the legislator is capable of procuring central government resources for the area -a main concern of voters in developing countries (Kitshelt 2000 , Baldwin 2013 ). This procurement of resources is clearest to see when lower-level units are the principle administrative tier or they guaranteed a pot of development funds, as the area now gets relatively more resources than it did before the split. But even if lower-level unit creation does not result in a financial windfall -as in most cases -it will still result in the appointment a local administrator (e.g., appointed mayor, local councillor, village head) and other ancillary staff.
8 These new appointees are drawn from the area, meaning that the local legislator will have created a handful of new jobs. More importantly, the newly-appointed administrator becomes a point-person who advocates on behalf of the area to political elites for more resources. This administrator serves as a lobbyist for her residents'
requests.
But perhaps of most significance is that these administrators serve as coordinators for local development projects. Mechanically, the area's smaller size means that the administrator can more easily identify the projects that are most needed by the local community and will have the largest impact on local development. 9 Moreover, these administrators use their authority to solve collective-action problems and bring together "stakeholders" to best implement these local development projects and guarantee their success. In theorizing about the role of "unelected local elites in leadership positions," Baldwin (2013) writes that they are "in a unique position to lobby on behalf of their communities, to obtain information on problems, to organize local resources, and to ensure community participation in programs." Lower-level unit creation and the appointment of a local administrator can make current development efforts more efficient even when proliferation happens outside the principle administrative tier or does not result in a guaranteed pot of development money.
Lower-level unit creation can help the legislator get re-elected in a second way: by giving the legislator more political brokers (or intermediaries) who themselves increase her local support.
Unit creation begets a neopatrimonial relationship between the legislator and the local administrators within her constituency. This is because a legislator informally affects the career trajectory of these bureaucrats through connections with national-level elites that make hiring and promotion decisions. In return, these administrators use their state authority to benefit the legislator. For instance, these administrators can distribute state benefits only to supporters of the legislator or obstruct her opponents from voting. In addition, local residents have an incentive to support the administrator's legislative patron because, "by bundling votes [local] intermediaries gain leverage 9 Even if there is some planning at higher levels for local development projects, local administrators are consulted to ensure that the project is feasible and will have the intended impact.
to acquiesce promises of resources on behalf of their followers" (Koter 2013, 193) . 10 The greater the extent that the community supports the local legislator, the more leverage the local administrator has to ask the legislator for more resources for the area in the future.
11
The creation of lower-level units also engenders a second patronage relationship between the executive and the area legislator. Lower-level unit creation in a legislator's constituency increases the overall stock of central government resources that the legislator can claim she secured for the area. Executive creation of a unit in a constituency allows the receiving legislator to concentrate her limited campaign funds on other local development activities that will help her get re-elected.
In return, the executive expects the legislator's support in parliament. Legislative support may take a variety of forms, including voting in favor of legislation that the executive supports, opposingor refusing to bring up in the first place -legislation which may harm executive power, or playing down presidential corruption scandals.
We now shift to discussing lower-level unit proliferation specifically within a context of weak parties and weak party systems -which are exceedingly common in sub-Saharan Africa (Riedl 2014 ) -to examine how lower-level unit proliferation can affect party defections. Lower-level unit creation as a way to ensure legislative support from co-partisan legislators is an especially attractive strategy for executives in weak party systems. Weak parties offer fewer resources to their legislators; they are unlikely to have a strong party brand that legislators can run on, a solid network of grassroots activists, or elite donors that consistently contribute to party coffers. Instead, legislators often seek personalized inducements to not defect (Arriola et al. 2016) . 12 Moreover, 10 Koter (2013) discusses community leaders with moral authority as opposed to administrators, but the same logic will likely hold so long as the local administrator is sufficiently embedded, as
Tsai (2007) shows in rural China. 11 Even those legislators that are fairly secure in their position benefit from the creation of new lower-level units as they now have to spend relatively fewer of their own personal resources to ensure that a viable challenger does not emerge. 12 Indeed, Arriola et al. (2016) suggest that the particularistic benefits -say, for instance, new there are fewer costs to party switching in countries with weak parties as constituents do not punish party switching and party leaders cannot enforce discipline.
At the same time, the benefits to a legislator who defects from the ruling party can be high: in many developing countries, donor reforms to privatize the public sector have allowed new parties to offer their candidates financial resources that rival those of the ruling party (Arriola 2012) .
Importantly, defection away from the ruling party does not necessarily mean defection to the opposition. In many weakly institutionalized party systems, parties differ not on policy preferences but on the societal groups that receive state patronage. Put differently, legislators and their voters are not worried about the ideological differences between the ruling party or the opposition because these parties often do not occupy different policy spaces. Legislators who defect from the ruling party often create splinter parties which are open to caucusing with their former party in the legislature -so long as they are remunerated adequately. Defecting legislators can subsequently command a high price from the executive to enter into a legislative coalition (Kelly 2015) .
For presidents in countries with weak party systems, legislator defection creates the potential for divided government and a hostile legislature. A defecting legislator is unlikely to directly affect a president through decreased votes for the president herself. Split-ticket voting is more common than in stronger party systems (Mainwaring 1998) lower-level administrative units -that a president of a weak party can offer may potentially offset some of the negative externalities of the weakness of her party. 13 We note that our model differs from that of party switching presented by Desposato (2005) . We argue that in weak party systems legislators do not threaten to switch parties as much as they threaten to defect from their current party to start a small splinter party. None of the large parties can offer the legislator financial support, but a legislator can set herself up to caucus with her former party if she creates a splinter party. Thus the relevant quantity is not so much the level of resources that a new party can offer a legislator, but instead, the level of resources that a The ability to defect is not equally distributed among the executive's co-partisan legislators, however. The ability to defect is highest among those legislators who have strong constituency support. These types of politicians get re-elected because of the level of local resources they bring to the area, regardless of whether they switch parties (Wilfahrt 2016) . Their high levels of local support, and thus expectation of re-election, buys them bargaining power with which they can extract more resources from the executive in return for legislative cooperation. Within weak party systems, then, an executive will use lower-level unit creation to preemptively co-opt those legislators in their own party who have strong enough local support to win election as an independent or minor-party candidate.
There is a possibility that a legislator who receives lower-level units in exchange for staying with the ruling party can renege on this commitment and defect from the ruling party nonetheless. This is a risk that presidents in multi-party systems must live with: presidents' attempts to co-opt legislators into not defecting are not binding. Co-opting legislators with patronage -including new lower-level units -ultimately creates a sitation in which the president empowers those who he needs support from.
Despite this dilemma and the possibility of reneging, there are three reasons why presidents may still utilize the strategy of creating lower-level units to prevent defections. First, the creation of lower-level administrative units for legislators is still optimal for the president, so long as it serves to co-opt a sufficient number of legislators in the aggregate. Lower-level unit proliferation is fairly low cost for the president -when lower-level units are not the principal administrative tier, the largest cost is that of hiring a new administrator -while the potential benefits of legislative compliance are high.
Second, a president can undermine the neopatrimonial relationship between a reneging legislator and the administrators under the legislator. After new units are created, a president can refuse legislator can gain from the ruling party by promising not to defect ex ante relative to the amount of resources she can extract from the president after she defects.
to pay the salaries of administrators in the constituency of a particular legislator or deny requests to promote these administrators to higher ranks.
14 While presidential monitoring is not good enough to monitor the thousands of local administrators across the country, it is much easier to monitor a few dozen co-partisan legislators whose legislative actions are clear and ensure their compliance by punishing (or threatening to punish) the legislators' agents.
15
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, high discount rates can lead the president and legislators to place less weight on the long-term political risks of unit creation. Instead, an emphasis on short-term political survival may lead both sets of actors to place a high value on the immediate political advantages that unit creation can confer. The tendency for politicians to heavily discount the future will be even higher in moments of political transition and uncertainty (Pierson 2004 , Bates 2008 , Gibson 2010 , such as transition away from one-party rule. More broadly, presidential creation of lower-level units in a manner that seems to weaken the president's bargaining position or executive power parallels much of the literature on the politics of subnational reform. Presidents may recognize the inherent risks involved with any reform that changes the balance of power between center and periphery -be it devolution, federalism, or unit creation -but these risks are often outweighed by the desire to maintain power in the immediate future. As Kent Eaton notes in his analysis of decentralization in Chile and Uruguay, "short-term political demands led national reformers to embrace changes that would have long-term and potentially problematic consequences" (Eaton 2004, pp. 3-4) .
16
14 Presidents will not undermine the relationship between the legislator and lower-level unit administrator unnecessarily. If a president does undermine this relationship for a legislator who has not reneged (or defected), the legislator has little incentive not to renege (or defect) in the future. 15 Legislators still value administrative units as a patronage good, even though it ties them to the president, due to a tendency to place extreme emphasis on their short-term political survival. As we note below, this is especially true in moments of political transition, such as the beginning of multi-party elections. 16 Indeed, this logic of short-term survival over long-run consequences has been argued as a moti-Overall, unit creation -at all tiers -benefits presidents. Given the large toolkit that presidents with strong executive power have, they opt for those tools that are most appropriate for a given political challenge. Unit creation at higher-tiers of government proves useful in directly helping presidents win re-election, meet local demand, or split the opposition. However, the characteristics of lower-level units make them ill-suited for those these pursuits. Instead, they are more indirectly useful -their proliferation can help a president maintain support of subnational political elite who more directly benefit from their proliferation. In this section we introduce the case under study: Kenya in the decade immediately following the return to multi-party elections in 1992. We provide details about two elements of Kenyan politics that make it an appropriate case for our theory: 1) the importance of Parliament to President Daniel arap Moi and, 2) the relationship between bureaucrats in Kenya's lower-level administrative units vator for higher-level unit creation too: Green (2010) finds that district creation in Uganda has been driven by Museveni's attempt to co-opt opposition leaders. Yet, by giving opposition leaders their own district, Museveni empowers these leaders by allowing them to, in the long-run, grow their local clout and become locally-entrenched. 17 That said, there may exist a connection between unit creation at higher and lower tiers of the state. Indeed, at least 70% of countries listed in Table 1 of parties was ridiculous. So of course we were worried about defections; MPs would ask for state 18 Parliament was not able to pass a new constitution under Moi, but did pass amendments that limited executive authority (Cottrell & Ghai 2007) . The legislature wasn't able to pass stricter restrictions on the executive, however, because Moi had co-opted many MPs (Hornsby 2011) .
goodies [to stay in the party] so we would try to oblige." 19 Internal splinters rose to the surface, as members had competing visions about the future of the party (Hornsby 2011 , Elischer 2013 ).
KANU did not have a clear policy platform, a popular track record from previous decades, or a well-endowed base that could fund campaigns (Throup & Hornsby 1998) . With the introduction of economic austerity measures mandated by international development partners, the party was limited in its ability to tap state coffers to help its MPs win re-election (van de Walle 2001). Further, the simultaneous privatization of the banking sector allowed MPs to find avenues outside of KANU to finance their campaigns (Arriola 2012) . Many KANU MPs defected to opposition parties, which had easier nomination processes or promised financial resources for candidates (Kanyinga 2000) .
Defections were even a threat in KANU's strongholds. The party's most popular MPs had But that support did not come cheap. One opposition MP was accused of having gone to State
House -the executive residence -the day before the vote and receiving a large bribe and acres of prime land. 21 While it was possible for Moi to co-opt opposition legislators in the legislature, it clearly proved expensive to do so. 19 Interview with former Permanent Secretary (1991 -1996 ), October 18, 2015 Indeed, some of the president's co-ethnic MPs defected, despite strong levels of local support for KANU (Lynch 2011) . 21 Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard), June 1997, pgs. 980 -990.
Parliament was not the only place where executive-legislative relations shaped politics during these years. Politics at the local level were also moulded by the interaction between legislators and the executive branch, made possible by the Provincial Administration (PA), Kenya's five-tier administrative system and executive bureaucracy (see Table 2 ). We focus our analysis on lowertiered administrative "locations" and "sub-locations" -and their respective bureaucratic officers, "Chiefs" and "Assistant Chiefs." We note that while chieftancy positions in other parts of Africa are hereditary or serve a large cultural purpose, these are appointed positions in Kenya which serve a wholly bureaucratic function (their title is a holdover from the colonial period). We focus on these units for two reasons. First, these are the only Kenyan administrative units that fit within political constituencies, and thus are within the scope of the theory. At the start of our study, each constituency averaged 5.85 locations and 18.90 sub-locations. Second, the administrators who run them are the only administrators who are stationed in the area for their entire careers. All other PA officers are rotated across stations in part to stop them from becoming entrenched in an area.
These bureaucrats are tasked with running their jurisdiction and "knowing" its residents. Chiefs and assistant chiefs must be from the jurisdiction they serve and thus, speak the vernacular, are familiar with local customs, and can tap into family and ethnic networks. Chiefs and assistant chiefs use this local knowledge to disseminate information from the central government to residents, provide basic administrative services, help identify recipients for government benefits, and provide security in their jurisdiction.
[ Table 2 here] Important to note is that the creation of new administrative locations and sub-locations does not entail a large financial windfall to the area. 22 This second quote suggests that chiefs use their position to extract from the local population though these overall costs are outweighed by the resulting local benefits. Further, as we discuss later, some of the money extracted from this petty corruption was remitted to the chief's patron, the local MP.
MPs take a special interest in who fills these positions. MPs lobby those higher-level administrative elites who run the initial interview process for the appointment of local chiefs and assistant chiefs;
Where an MP wants so-and-so to be chief or assistant chief he appoints the guy without reference to the qualifications of the guy. Now, when that particular person is appointed, his loyalty will go to the MP and when it comes to campaigning he will come out strong for that guy [the MP]. The number of locations increased from around 1,100 to 2,500 and the number of sub-locations increased from 3,500 to circa 6,500 over our study period. We show this growth by constituency in Figure 1 . Grossman & Lewis (2014) and Pierskalla (2016) argue that examining unit creation at a level of analysis above the unit being split risks ignoring sub-unit drivers of proliferation. In the SI we 35 DDPs were unavailable for one district in 1994 and two districts in 1997. We remove these districts from the analysis. We could not identify all DDPs in 2002; for those districts, we use lower-level units from the 1999 census. 36 Interview with Permanent Secretary of PAIS (1991 -1996) , 01 July 2012, Nairobi, Kenya. Interview with PC (1992 PC ( -2003 , 02 February 2012, Nairobi, Kenya. Interview with then Deputy Secretary of PA, 13 October 2011, Nairobi, Kenya. 37 We present summary statistics for the variables in the main regressions in the SI. attempt to remedy this concern by showing that sub-unit characteristics that previous work has shown drives higher-level unit proliferation -ethnic heterogeneity (Pierskalla 2016) , the presence of local ethnic minorities (Kasara 2006 , Hassan 2016 , and local development (Grossman & Lewis 2014 ) -were equivalent for split and parent locations in a sample of split lower-level units. This strongly suggests that units were not created because of existing differences within the unit being split. However, we believe that looking at the constituency-level is appropriate for our analysis as our theory is about individual legislators.
In the following analyses, we use two dependent variables: the number of new locations and the number of new sub-locations created in a constituency in a particular period. We run an OLS regression and cluster standard errors at the district-level to account for concerns about the independence of geographically proximate units.
We operationalize a KANU MP's local support two ways. Using two separate measures of MP popularity helps ensure that we are capturing the individual MP's popularity, as opposed to KANU's or Moi's.
38 First, we look at the vote share of KANU MPs in the previous election (KANUMPLaggedVS). For this specification we subset the data to only KANU MPs given the high level of correlation between whether a constituency had a KANU MP and the KANU MP's vote share (81%). 39 Second, we measure a KANU MP's support relative to other candidates in the constituency by interacting an indicator variable for whether a constituency was represented by a KANU MP in a given period (KANUMP) with the constituency's effective number of parties (ENP) in the previous election. 40 Our theory predicts that Moi created new units for KANU MPs who have strong independent followings (and thus could capitalize the most from defecting), therefore we expect to observe a positive coefficient on the lower-order KANUMP term combined with a 38 These measures are not highly correlated; 51% for Wave 2, 53% for Wave 3. 39 In the SI, we re-run the analysis over the full sample of MPs and find substantively similar results.
We also re-run the analysis after controlling for Moi's local popularity. 40 ENP is calculated according to Laakso & Taagepera (1979) . negative coefficient on the interaction term.
The regressions control for other factors that may have affected unit creation, including measures hypothesized to affect proliferation by existing literature on higher-level units. To control for whether new units were created in response to local ethnic diversity, the model includes the constituency's ethno-linguistic fractionalization measured with a standard herfindahl index (ELF) (Pierskalla 2016) . We include the percentage of residents in a constituency that were from Moi's larger pastoralist ethnic group -the KAMATUSA -to test if Moi decentralized power away from his co-ethnic base (KAMATUSA) (Green 2010) . 41 These two variables use ethnicity data from a 2.5% sample of the 1989 census, the most recent census before the beginning of our analysis. 42 We test for marginalization (Grossman & Lewis 2014) by including the percentage of residents that have access to piped water (Piped). 43 We include a dummy variable indicating if the constituency's MP was a cabinet member (Cabinet). 44 To test if the creation of lower-level units was driven by administrative factors, we include the log of the constituency's 1989 population and area in square kilometers (lpop and lsqkm). We also include the number of units in the constituency in the period leading up to unit creation to control for initial variation (UnitsBaseline). We include a dummy for whether a constituency split (ConstituencySplit) for regressions that look at Periods 2 -3, as new constituencies were created in 1996.
In the SI, we also control for ethnicity two additional ways. We test if new units were created for minority ethnic groups by including a dummy variable for those constituencies whose largest ethnic group differed from the rest of the district, and thus was likely marginalized. We also include 41 The KAMATUSA are the four "indigenous" pastoralist ethnic groups of Moi's home provincethe Kalenjin, Maasai, Samburu, and Turkana -who had supported Moi since independence (see (Horowitz Forthcoming) on ethnicity and political behavior in Kenya). 42 We aggregate ethnicity information at the sub-location level to create constituency-level figures. 43 This variable is also from the census sample. The census also has other potential measures of marginalization, but they are not prevalent among the population. 44 We are unable to find Cabinet information for Period 1 (pre-1992) . the percentage of each constituency's largest ethnic group. We do not include these variables here for fear of double-counting with ELF.
Results: Units for Strong KANU Legislators
The results, listed in Table 3 2.87, 3.04) and 6.28 sub-locations (95% CI: 6.07, 6.48) in Period 2, and 2.08 locations (95% CI:
2.00, 2.16) and 3.98 sub-locations (95% CI: 3.73, 4.23) in Period 3.
[ Table 3 here]
Results: Robustness Tests
We perform several robustness tests to show that, first, lower-level unit creation was not driven by an attempt to directly benefit President Moi, and second, that it was not driven by other factors from those hypothesized here. They are presented and explained in greater depth in the SI. First, we re-run all models after subbing out legislator-level independent variables for the equivalent ones for President Moi to show that lower-level unit proliferation only directly helped legislators.
The independent variable using Moi's indicators of support are significant in only two of the eight models. These results indicate that, first, unit creation was not driven by Moi's direct re-election concerns, and second, helps bolster our argument that unit creation was driven by a KANU MP's individual popularity as opposed to the party's. Second, we examine if lower-level unit creation was due to a coattails or reverse coattails effect, but find little support for either. Third, we regress an area's change in vote share for Moi on the number of lower-level units created in the preceding period and find no effect. We also run the number of lower-level units created on an area's lagged vote share and find no significant relationship.
Fourth, we consider if Moi created new lower-level units to his core supporters, the KAMA-TUSA who gave him the strongest support among Kenya's 40+ ethnic groups. The results indicate that Moi did not only create new lower-level administrative units for his personal base and staunchest supporters, but for all KANU MPs which spanned many of Kenya's ethnic groups. Finally, we examine whether lower-level unit creation was a residual of higher-level district creation. We run the main models after controlling for whether an MP's constituency was part of a newly split district in the previous wave and find no relationship.
Examining the Effects: Preventing Party Defections
There is archival evidence in support of our mechanism: KANU MPs saw the creation of new units as patronage from the president, for which they did not defect from KANU in return. In return, we wish to express our gratefulness and to confirm our total commitment to you."
48
We attempt to examine this logic quantitatively, though we do so cautiously given the statistical inference problems with this enterprise. We measure party defections in two ways. First, we code as our outcome variable whether a KANU MP sought re-election on the KANU ticket in the subsequent election (KANUMPAndRanAsKANU). Second, we code as our outcome variable whether a KANU MP defected from KANU (KANUDefector). For both specifications during Wave 2, we re run the analyses first over those constituencies in which a sitting KANU MP sought re-election and then the full sample.
Our main explanatory variables are a count of the number of new locations or new sub-locations created in a constituency during the previous legislative session (UnitsCreatedInPreviousPeriod).
For Wave 2 analyses, we also include the MP's lagged vote share.
There may be concern about the introduction of post-treatment bias if these variables represent units created after MPs decided which party they would run for. Secondary research on these elections, however, indicates that MPs largely decided the party ticket to run on in the final two 46 Letter from MP Runyenjes to DO Manyatta, 15 August 1991, Folio BB/11/140. 47 Letter from Isiolo Leaders to President Moi, 28 March 1994, Folio BB/11/140. 48 Letter from Marsabit Leaders to President Moi, 28 March 1994, Folio BB/11/140. months before the election. This is because Moi made it politically costly for MPs to defect from KANU while parliament was still in session by stipulating that an MP had to be elected from her current party to hold a seat, and simultaneously refused to hold special elections for defectors; this meant that those who defected while parliament was still in session lost their seat (and salary), influence, and created a power vacuum in their constituency that rival candidates could capitalize on. Instead, MPs largely stayed in KANU until Moi dissolved Parliament, just months before each election (Throup & Hornsby 1998) . Similarly, Elischer (2013, 43) claims that campaigning for elections did not begin "in earnest" until the November before each December election.
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 4 and provide suggestive evidence that the creation of new lower-level units in the run-up to an election influenced MPs to stay on the KANU ticket. Nine of the twelve specifications indicate that an increase in lower-level administrative units is associated with a significant increase in likelihood that a KANU MP subsequently runs on the KANU ticket. Columns 1 and 2 are significant at p = 0.11 and Column 9 is signed in the correct direction. 49 We plot the associated predicted probabilities for columns 1 -4 after increasing the amount of locations or sub-locations from the 10 th to the 90 th percentile in Figure 2 . We estimate that tower-level unit creation led to a 9 -25 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of a KANU MP defecting. 
Conclusion
This paper provides a novel theory for the creation of lower-level administrative units. New lowerlevel units serve as patronage to area residents and provide the area legislator with a new political broker. Presidents create these units to minimize the risk of losing a legislative majority as well as to co-opt legislators in the party, factors that decrease the probability of facing legislative 50 Interview with MP, 01 March 2012, Nairobi, Kenya.
constraints on executive power. When the president presides over a weak party, lower-level unit creation can also prevent legislators from defecting from the party.
We find evidence in support of our argument in the decade after Kenya's return to multi-party elections, where the number of lower-level units doubled. President Moi doled out new administrative locations and sub-locations to MPs in his party, and especially those who were at the highest risk of defecting. We estimate that the preemptive creation of these units was associated with as much as a 25% decrease in defections from KANU. This result is substantively important -the expected increase in KANU defections without lower-level unit proliferation in either the 1992 or 1997 election may have led KANU to lose its legislative majority and allowed for greater legislative constraint on President Moi. Although these are geographically small units, they had a significantly large impact on Moi's ability to maintain control over the legislature after the end of one-party rule and the emergence of elected opposition elites.
The theory has wide applicability and has the potential to explain bouts of lower-level unit proliferation outside the case examined. Consider neighboring Tanzania's 7% increase in lowest-level administrative villages over the past decade to almost 18,000 today. This increase has coincided with the ruling CCM's decline and the defection of many MPs away from the party. Each unit's local administrator ("village executive officer") is widely considered a political broker for the local MP, using their authority to stop opposition candidates from securing a foothold in the constituency.
In Malaysia, the number of districts has increased by about 10% over the past decade, with each district having up to 24 councillors that are assigned to an individual sub-district area. There, councillors are perceived to be agents of those subnational elected elites that helped get them appointed at either the federal or state-level (Siti-Nabiha & Salleh 2013). Malaysia, too, has seen a decline in its ruling party, with party defections growing in frequency. Or consider the Philippines, where parties have been weak since the fall of Marcos' Liberal Party in 1986. The number of barangays has increased over the past decade to more than 42,000 today. Barangay leaders are elected locally, but they end up becoming brokers for higher subnational political incumbents (e.g., mayor, MP, governor) who have the resources to get the barangay leader elected in the first place (de Dios 2007) . For these cases and many others, future research should test the linkages we propose about executives, subnational elites, and lower-level unit creation to refine the theory we propose here.
More broadly, this paper links research on territorial politics to a broader literature on the politics of executive-legislative relations in new democracies. New research, especially on Africa, has credited the strength of legislative institutions and opposition parties to the institutional legacies of one-party authoritarian rule (e.g., Arriola 2012 , LeBas 2014 , Reidl 2014 , Opalo 2016 . Our findings suggest that the strength or weakness of these veto players on the executive is a direct result of presidential action after the beginning of elections. We observe weak legislatures that are unwilling to constrain the executive precisely because they are dominated by the executive's party members who have been co-opted. Moreover, a president's co-optation of strong individual legislators serves to further decrease elite incentives to invest in party organization, thus perpetuating existing levels of party weakness. In extreme cases, these tactics can entirely co-opt the legislature, perpetuating competitive authoritarian regimes, rather than allowing for a steady march towards robust democracy. For inter-governmental checks and balances to prevail, attempts to strengthen the legislature must be accompanied by reforms that also limit other forms of arbitrary use of executive power. 174 * * * p < 0.001, * * p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1. OLS regressions of number of new administrative units created in a constituency during a period on KANU MP's local support. Columns 1 -4 measure local support as a KANU MP's local vote share in the previous election. Columns 5 -8 measure local support as an interaction term between whether the constituency has KANU MP and the effective number of parties in the previous election. Columns 1, 2, 5, 6 examine unit creation during Period 2, Columns 3, 4, 7, 8 examine Period 3. The derivation of the variables is described in the text. Standard errors clustered at the district-level. Table 4 .
